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From Individual Motives to Partial Consensus: A Dynamic Game Model. (arXiv:1706.09741v1 [math.OC])

来源于:arXiv
A noncooperative differential (dynamic) game model of opinion dynamics, where the agents' motives are shaped by how susceptible they are to get influenced by others, how stubborn they are, and how quick they are willing to change their opinions on a set of issues in a prescribed time interval is considered. We prove that a unique Nash equilibrium exists in the game if there is a harmony of views among the agents of the network. The harmony may be in the form of similarity in pairwise conceptions about the issues but may also be a collective agreement on the status of a "leader" in the network. The existence of a Nash equilibrium can be interpreted as an emergent collective behavior out of the local interaction rules and individual motives. 查看全文>>