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Punishment and inspection for governing the commons in a feedback-evolving game. (arXiv:1807.05484v1 [physics.soc-ph])
来源于:arXiv
Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members. While
cooperator players restrain themselves and consider the proper state of
resources, defectors demand more than their supposed share for a higher payoff.
To avoid the tragedy of the common state, punishing the latter group seems to
be an adequate reaction. This conclusion, however, is less straightforward when
we acknowledge the fact that resources are finite and even a renewable resource
has limited growing capacity. To clarify the possible consequences, we consider
a coevolutionary model where beside the payoff-driven competition of cooperator
and defector players the level of a renewable resource depends sensitively on
the fraction of cooperators and the total consumption of all players. The
applied feedback-evolving game reveals that beside a delicately adjusted
punishment it is also fundamental that cooperators should pay special attention
to the growing capacity of renewable resources. Otherwise, even the u 查看全文>>