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Designing Coalition-Proof Mechanisms for Auctions over Continuous Goods. (arXiv:1711.06774v2 [cs.GT] UPDATED)
来源于:arXiv
This paper investigates reverse auctions that involve continuous values of
different types of goods, general nonconvex constraints, and second stage
costs. Our analysis seeks to design the payment rules and conditions under
which coalitions of participants cannot influence the auction outcome in order
to obtain higher collective utility. Under incentive-compatible bidding in the
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, coalition-proof outcomes are achieved if the
submitted bids are convex and the constraint sets are of polymatroid-type.
Unfortunately, these conditions do not capture the complexity of the general
class of reverse auctions under consideration. By relaxing the property of
incentive-compatibility, we investigate further payment rules that are
coalition-proof, but without any extra conditions. Among coalition-proof
mechanisms, we select the mechanism that minimizes the participants' abilities
to benefit from strategic manipulations, in order to incentivize truthful
bidding from the 查看全文>>