In this paper, we study the efficiency of egoistic and altruistic strategies within the model of social dynamics determined by voting in a stochastic environment (the ViSE model) using two criteria: maximizing the average capital increment and minimizing the number of bankrupt participants. The proposals are generated stochastically; three families of the corresponding distributions are considered: normal distributions, symmetrized Pareto distributions, and Student's $t$-distributions. It is found that the "pit of losses" paradox described earlier does not occur in the case of heavy-tailed distributions. The egoistic strategy better protects agents from extinction in aggressive environments than the altruistic ones, however, the efficiency of altruism is higher in more favorable environments. A comparison of altruistic strategies with each other shows that in aggressive environments, everyone should be supported to minimize extinction, while under more favorable conditions, it is more 查看全文>>